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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
WEENIG BROTHERS, INC., a Cor-
poration, 
Plaintiff and Appellant} 
vs. Case No. 7992 
M. NEPHI MANNING, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
Comes now the appellant, W eenig Brothers, Inc., a. Cor-
poration, and petitions the Court for a rehearing and reargu-
ment of the above-entitled cause upon the following grounds: 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE 
RECORD IN THIS CASE BY AFFIRMING THAT POR-
TION OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DISTRICT 
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COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT NEGLIGENT IN THE OPERATION OF HIS AUTO-
MOBILE. AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
POINT II 
THAT THE COURT HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY 
EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE· IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE -DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY · OF NEGLI-
GENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THE OPERATION 
OF HIS AUTOMOBILE ON THE WRONG OR IMPROPER 
SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY AND THAT SUCH NEGLI-
GENCE WAS NOT THE SOLE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF THE COLLISION. 
POINT III 
THAT THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS 
IN A DANGEROUS PR~CEDENT BEING ESTABLISHED 
IN THE AUTOMOBILE LAW OF THIS STATE PERTAIN-
ING TO VEHICLES PASSING ONE ANOTHER WHILE 
TRAVELING IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS, AND THE DE· 
CISION THEREFORE SHOULD BE RECALLED AND THE 
CASE REHEARD. 
WHER~FORE, petitioner prays that the judgment and 
opinion of the Court be recalled and a reargument be permitted 
of the entire case. 
A brief in support of this etition is filed 
Attorney for Appellant 
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F. ROBERT BAYLE hereby certifies that he is attorney 
of record for the appellant and petitioner herein, and that in 
his opinion there is good cause to believe that the judgment 
and decision of the Court is erroneous and that the case should 
be reheard and reargued as prayed for in said petition. 
Dated this 31st day of December, 195 3. . 
?: 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE 
RECORD IN THIS CASE BY AFFIRMING THAT POR-
TION OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT NEGLIGENT IN THE OPERATION OF HIS AUTO-
MOBILE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
There would appear to be no necessity f_or again setting 
forth the facts involved in this case as they were thoroughly 
outlined in the original briefs and fully discussed upon oral 
argument. However, it would appear from the decision of 
the Court that certain of these facts have been minimized in 
their application to the questions of law involved in this case. 
In the Court's opinion on file herein, Mr. Justice Crockett 
holds in the first instance that defendant was guilty of no con-
duct in the operation of his automobile which could be con-
sidered negligence as a matter of law. The evidence is undis-
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puted concerni~g the distance the defendant's vehicle traveled 
ont~ . the plaintiff's side of the. highway. The plaintiff testified 
that the def~ndant was completely over ·onto his side of the 
highway and was in the act of passing another vehicle. The 
defendant testified that he swung his vehicle onto the 9ther 
or left side of the highway six ·or seven feet and was in that 
position when he· first observed the headlights on the plaintiff's 
truck ·approaching him. Section 41-6-57, Utah Code Annotated 
. 1953,_ prescribes the conditions under which vehicles traveling 
in the same direction may pass one another on a two-lane road-
way: 
· ttNo vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the 
center of the ro_adway in overtaking and passing an-
other vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless 
such left side is clearly visible and free from oncoming 
traffic. for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such 
overtaking and passing to be completely made without 
interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle 
approaching .from the opposite direction or any vehicle 
overtaken. In every event the overtaking vehicle must 
return to the right-hand side of the roadway before 
coming within 100 feet of any vehicle approaching 
· from the opposite direction." 
We have italicized ·the last sentence of the foregoing 
statute tO. emphasize the defendant's acts as a violation of this 
legislative enactment. There is, and was, an absolute duty im-
posed upon the defendant under thelanguage of this statute 
to require that when he decided. to turn to the left side of the 
highway and attempt to pas~ the truck which he said was 
ahead of him, he should not do so without being able to 
return to his own right-hand side of the highway before coming 
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. within 100 feet of the plaintiff's truck which was approaching 
from the opposite direction. The defendant said that visibility 
was limited and that when h~ turned to the left-hand side of 
the highway, he could see the headlights of a vehicle which 
he later determined to be that of the plaintiff, and which were 
seventy-five to one hundred feet away. There could be abso-
lutely no conclusion other than that defe.ndant was guilty of 
violating this statu~e. There is no conflict in the evidence with 
respect to this aspect of the case as the defendant's own testi-
mony placed his automobile six or seven feet over onto plain-
tiff's side of the highway and as his vehicle was a little less 
than six feet in width, this meant that he was traveling wholly 
upon plaintiff's side of the highway when he observed the 
headlights of plaintiff's truck some seventy-five to one hundred 
feet ahead ·of him. As this Court said in the case of North vs. 
Cartwright; 229 Pac. 2d 871, in construing this same statute: 
ttThis statute w.as promulgated for the protection of 
the public and to safeguard property, life and limb of 
persons using the highways, from accidents. of the 
type here involved. Violation of this statute then, con-
stitutes negligence in law. This doctrine of the law has 
been steadfast! y adhered to by this court and generally · 
in other courts throughout the United States." 
The test appears to be that when a standard of duty 
or care is fixed by law or ordinance, and such law or ordinance 
has reference to the safety of life, limb, or property, then, as 
a matter of necessity, a violation of such law or ordinance con-
stitutes negligence. Skerl vs. Willow Creek Coal Company, 
92 Utah 474, 69 Pac. 2d 502, 506. 
Applying the foregoing principles to our instant case, it 
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is difficult to conceive how this Court concluded that defendant 
Manning was not negligent as a matter of law. Had this been 
a jury case, the evidence would have required the trial court 
to withhold from the jury's consideration the question of de-
fendant's negligence as that evidence showed with conclusive 
certainty that reasonable minds could reach no other conclu-
sion than that defendant Manning had violated the law. The 
trial court erred in not finding the defendant negligent and 
we respectfully submit that this Court .should reconsider its 
decision in the light of the foregoing and adopt a clear and 
positive doctrine in this case which will be in conformity with 
decisions heretofore rendered interpreting the aforementioned 
statute. 
POINT II 
THAT THE COURT HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY 
EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUlL TY OF NEGLI-
GENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THE OPERATION 
OF HIS AUTOMOBILE ON THE WRONG OR IMPROPER 
SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY AND THAT SUCH NEGLI-
GENCE WAS NOT THE SOLE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF THE COLLISION. 
We should like to now consider that portion of the 
Court's decision affirming the trial court's findings that plain-
tiff's driver was guilty of negligence which proximately con-
tributed to the accident. It is respectfully submitted that a 
portion of this Court's optnton is particularly alarming to 
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counsel when applied to the practicalities of the situation. It 
is that portion of the decision dealing with the relative dis-
tances and speeds of the respective vehicles and wherein the 
Court says that W eenig had 15 feet in which he could have 
turned to his right sufficient to have missed defendant Man-
ning. In practically every situation, the driver who turns to 
the left or improper side of the highway in at)ticipation of 
passing a vehicle proceeding in the same direction ahead of 
him, has control of the situation. Manning had control of 
the situation in our instant case. It was necessary for Weenig 
to discover Manning after he turned onto the easterly side 
of the roadway. It was the chance that Manning took that 
created the hazardous situation for he himself testified· that 
he was completely over on Weenig's side of the road when 
he saw the approaching headlights some seventy-five to one 
hundred feet away. The excessive speed of W eenig, if any, 
may have constituted negligent driving but that negligence did 
not contribute to the accident. We believe that a person driving 
a motor vehicle on a highway has a right to rely upon observ-
ance of the law by other persons driving motor vehicles thereon, 
and one cannot be charged with negligence in failing to antici-
pate that the other may violate the law governing the use 
of the highway. Particularly is this true where vehicles are 
approaching each other from opposite directions and the turn-
ing driver has control of .the situation. Cederloff vs. Whited, 
Utah, 169 Pac. 2d 777. 
In our instant case, Manning attempted to explain away 
his negligence by testifying on direct examination that he had 
merely turned to his left to see if it was safe to pass th~ truck 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ahead of him. We are sure this explanation was conjured up 
by Manning as a defensive measure but certainly doesn't 
answer the question of why it was necessary for him to com-
pletely cross the center of the roadway in order to see if a 
passing could be made. We submit that the only reasonable 
inference to be drawn from all of the evidence is that Manning's 
negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the collision. 
It might be said that W eenig had a chance to avoid the col-
lision, but that chance was remote and certainly not a clear 
one. Manning's rights were inferior to those of Weenig and 
the former's culpable negligence created an alarming situation 
which required instantaneous action on the part of Weenig. 
He. had little more than a second to react and try to turn away 
from ~ disastrous head-on collision which would have surely 
occurred had not both drivers been able to slightly veer to the 
right thus resulting in only a sideswiping of their respective 
. vehicles. We urge the Court to reexamine the facts of this 
case in order to avert an injustice to the appellant which will 
surely occur if the judgment of the trial courf is affirmed. 
POINT III 
THAT. THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS 
IN A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT BEING ESTABLISHED 
IN THE AUTOMOBILE LAW OF THIS STATE PERTAIN-
ING TO VEHICLES PASSING ONE ANOTHER WHILE 
TRAVELING IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS, AND THE DE· 
CISION THEREFORE SHOULD BE RECALLED AND THE 
CASE REHEARD. 
10 
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Since this case has appeared in the advanced sheets of 
the Pacific Reporter, counsel for the petitioner herein has 
heard many members of the Bar express surprise~ and con-
cernment over the principles enunciated and counsel is sincerely· 
· apprehensive that this Court'.s decision, if permitted to stand 
unchanged, will establish a dangerous precedent in the automo-
bile law of this state. With our highways becoming increasingly 
dangerous due to the rapid growth of automobile travel, one 
may easily visualize that reckless drivers who are prone to 
take a chance by passing others when the oncoming traffic 
is too close for r~asonable safety, will find comfort and protec-
.... tion by merely saying they had turned out to see if it was safe 
for passing; or such drivers may well claim that the oncoming 
vehicle was traveling too fast and thereby contributed to the 
collision. We .can visualize situati9ns where a driver on. his 
own side of the roadway may be negligent in not having 
his vehicle under reasonable control or by not keeping a rea~ 
sonable lookout to avert an impending collision, but those 
situations would not be applicable to facts analogous to our 
instant case where the disfavored driver creates the hazardous · 
condition and the favored driver has only a second or two to 
extricate himself from a situation which to say the least is 
terrifying. We respectfully submit that reasonable minds. could 
not differ on that subject and this Court has set forth rules in 
this decision which will likely plague it and the automobile 
law in cases to come. Head-on collisions are ever increasing. 
They are for the most part largely responsible for the serious 
and tragic accidents daily killing and maiming our citizenry. 
Sometimes an entire family is wiped out. Highway departments 
throughout the United States are annually spending millions 
11 
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of dollars to divide our highways and thereby eliminate the 
cause for this tragic waste of life. These were the compelling 
reasons for your petitioner to urge this Court to rehear this 
case and re-examine the decision in order that the law of this 
State will not provide a recluse of safety for those drivers who 
clearly violate the rules of the road as the respondent herein 
did. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion your petitioner sincerely urges that this 
Court should grant a rehearing and reargument of this case 
and thereby review the entire matter in the light of the im-
portance of the aspects of the law presented in the foregoing. 
argument, and that upon such review it is sincerely felt that 
the Court will be compelled to find that the trial court should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. ROBERT BAYLE 
Attorney for Appellant and Petitioner 
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